People lock up 2 $NATIONs for up to 4 years to get a passport, but a few people may regret it and want to leave our country, we can be open to that and let them quit.
however, if someone wants to quit our country, some punishment needs to be imposed. we need to burn his passport and deduct 1 $NATION and transfer it to the treasury.This allows liquidity for someone who may need to cash out urgently.
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This is very good. Having an exit mechanism can reduce a lot of trouble.
To keep things simple at the beginning and build over already tested concepts & implementation, we decided to use the same voting escrow mechanics that you can find in prominent Defi protocols (veCRV, veBal, …).
But with the idea to be able to adapt the mechanics in the future, we included a mechanism to introduce new mechanics to voting escrow with the approval of the own holders.
I think now is too early to change the voting escrow mechanics, but not so early to start discussing things like this to achieve a refined update proposal in the future. Looking forward to reading more people’s thoughts on this.
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Absolutely, we need citizens, also it’s their right to select to stay or to leave.
To pulish some rules will be better protect our community and citizens, also keep the door open to new members.
It’s a good way. People must pay the price for their wrong behavior. “Produce 1 $nation” is the lowest price and the bottom line to restrict citizens.
I think the current design is better for the current state of the nation - particularly because all passport holders are / will be “invested” long-term. With the rage-quit function, you would get a lot of opportunistic users who buy the passport for a short-term activity that is to their benefit and then leave the nation. I see the points above but I think in the long-term it is beneficial to leave it as it is. Long-term investment can deter users from investing. However, it guarantees that we are all in this together for the long run. Once we build a strong community based on these fundamentals, I think it would be less problematic to introduce this.
I know you mention punishments and financial penalties. I still think just opening door to these ideas could backfire as we normalize it and next time people propose complete rage-quit options. In reality, you also cannot redeem your passport instantly for different citizenship 
Also, I think as @0xGallego points out. At this stage, we should focus on building the infrastructure of our community using existing tools/code. Coding time is costly and building custom-made contracts that do not push our community forward should not be prioritized.
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I agree with @massatio.eth on this one. If we want to move faster than traditional nation states, we need to avoid code complexity.
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#2 Rage Quit We believe the attraction behind cvxCRV was not only its high APR but, more importantly, its liquidity. As a result, we brainstormed a few different ways to preserve the benefits of the veToken design while still enabling potential liquidity for lockers if needed. The first option was to make vxGOV positions transferable NFTs (like Solidly). While this makes giving up GOV tokens to a Convex-like protocol significantly less attractive, there would be difficulty in pricing these NFT positions. We can also assume that sellers will be willing to take a discount on secondary markets for these positions, which may reduce the appeal of locking up GOV tokens. “Why lock up GOV if I can just buy an NFT at a discount?” would be a fair question for potential GOV buyers to ask, if vxGOV positions could be purchased readily. With this in mind, the other alternative we believe is superior is to introduce the ability to ragequit from vxGOV positions with a significant penalty to the quitter. Various strategies could be implemented, but here are a few potential ideas on how to implement a ragequit function for our hypothetical vxGOV: If you max lock vxGOV and wish to rage quit you will receive 50% of your GOV tokens back and the other 50% will be distributed back to the community. Your penalty for rage quitting reduces as your lock time decreases. Proceeds from rage quitters may be distributed in a few different ways.
- Diamond hands: GOV collected gets max relocked and distributed pro-rata based on vxGOV controlled by each account. This has the benefit of incentivizing “diamond hands” and long-term commitment to the protocol since these rewards will skew towards the most invested stakeholders in the protocol. 2) Treasury: This option will require a bit of active treasury management. For example, the funds could be used to procure a stake in other Convex or Redacted Cartel equivalents or build up a treasury of less correlated assets. 3) Protocol Owned Liquidity: An extension of #2, GOV in the treasury could be periodically deployed into a liquidity pool for the GOV token. This would help build a strong base of liquidity for GOV and would be “protocol-owned” liquidity, increasing GOV’s sustainability in the long run. We believe parameters such as penalty percentage and where the GOV is distributed will initially be dynamic, depending on protocol priorities. However, we are convinced that the penalty should always be significant to ensure governance powers go to parties that have the most vested interest within the protocol.
Exploring and building services that can be provided to citizens is the first priority